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PRETRIAL RELEASE & DETENTION IN MARYLAND AFTER THE 2017 
AMENDMENTS TO THE PRETRIAL RELEASE RULES 
 
Brian Saccenti* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From October 2016 to February 2017, the criminal law 
subcommittee of Maryland’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, the Standing Committee itself, and then the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland were presented with extensive evidence of the 
harm done by the criminal justice system’s frequent use of unaffordable 
money bail as a condition of release for arrestees. Pursuant to its rule-
making authority,1 the Court of Appeals dramatically revised the 
procedural rules governing pretrial release and detention.2  
 The impetus for the 2017 amendments was concern, expressed 
by Maryland’s Attorney General and others, that the practice of 
imposing unaffordable money bail that results in pretrial detention is 
unconstitutional and unjust.3 Accordingly, the most significant changes 
to the rules were to (a) prohibit courts from imposing financial 
conditions (referred to in the rule as a “special condition of release with 
financial terms”4) that result in the pretrial detention of the defendant,5 
and (b) expressly require courts to give priority to nonfinancial 
conditions of release (especially unsecured bonds).6 Other changes 
include: 
 
                                                 
© 2018 Brian Saccenti  
* Chief Attorney, Appellate Division, Maryland Office of the Public Defender. The 
author thanks Mary-Denise Davis and Ethan Frenchman for their helpful feedback. 
1 See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a) (providing in pertinent part that “[t]he Court of 
Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice 
and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other 
courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or 
modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law.”). 
2 Court of Appeals, Rules Order to Adopt Proposed New Rule 4-216.1 and 
Amendments to Current Rules (Feb. 16, 2017), 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/rodocs/ro192.pdf [hereinafter Rules Order]. 
3 See STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., 192D. REPORT TO THE COURT 
OF APPEALS at 2–3 (2016) [hereinafter 192d Report]. 
4 MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(A). Unless otherwise specified, all references to Rule 4-216 
are to the version that took effect July 1, 2017. 
5 See id. 
6 See MD. R. 4-216.1(b) & (d)(2)(N) advisory committee’s note. 
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• A prohibition on using money bail to ameliorate 
dangerousness;7  
• A requirement that the court consider “the recommendation of 
any pretrial release services program that has made a risk 
assessment of the defendant in accordance with a validated risk 
assessment tool and is willing to provide an acceptable level of 
supervision over the defendant during the period of release if so 
directed by the judicial officer”8 – a provision evidently 
designed to account for and encourage the development of 
pretrial services programs and the use of validated risk 
assessments; and  
 • An expanded list of conditions of release.9 
 
 These changes took effect July 1, 2017.10 The purpose of this 
article is to assist judges, commissioners, prosecutors, and defense 
counsel as they figure out how to apply the revised rules. Part I of this 
article discusses the concerns about the money bail system that led to 
the changes.11 Part II discusses general principles applicable to pretrial 
release determinations that were not changed by the rule amendments, 
but which guide their implementation at pretrial release hearings.12 Part 
III discusses the changes made by the 2017 amendments to the rules.13  
 
I. THE IMPETUS FOR THE AMENDMENTS 
 
Although concerns about Maryland’s pretrial release system are not 
new,14 the reform effort started gaining unprecedented momentum in 
                                                 
7 See MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(B) (providing in pertinent part that “[s]pecial conditions 
of release with financial terms are appropriate only to ensure the appearance of the 
defendant and may not be imposed solely to prevent future criminal conduct during 
the pretrial period or to protect the safety of any person or the community.”). 
8 MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(1). 
9 See MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2). 
10 See Rules Order, supra note 2, at 3. 
11 See infra Part I. 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See infra Part III. 
14 Executive, judicial, and independent agencies have all published reports on 
Maryland’s pretrial release system in the last fifteen years. See ABELL FOUND., THE 
PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT: A STUDY OF MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL RELEASE AND 
BAIL SYSTEM (2001), 
http://www.abell.org/sites/default/files/publications/hhs_pretrial_9.01%281%29.pdf 
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the fall of 2016.15 The impetus for the changes proposed by the Rules 
Committee was an October 11, 2016, advice letter from the Office of 
the Attorney General to five members of the General Assembly.16 That 
letter opined that:  
 
• “the Court of Appeals would conclude that the State's statutory 
law and court rules should be applied to require a judicial officer 
to conduct an individualized inquiry into a criminal defendant's 
ability to pay a financial condition of pretrial release”;  
• “in the event a judicial officer determines that pretrial detention 
is not justified to meet the State's regulatory goals, a judicial 
officer may not impose a financial condition set solely to detain 
the defendant”;  
• “setting the bail in an amount not affordable to the defendant, 
thus effectively denying release, raises a significant risk that the 
Court of Appeals would find it violates due process”; and  
• “[i]f pretrial detention is not justified yet bail is set out of reach 
financially for the defendant, it is also likely the Court would 
declare that the bail is excessive under the Eighth Amendment 
of the U.S. Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.”17 
 
                                                 
(analyzing the pretrial release system at the behest of the Maryland State Bar 
Association); JUSTICE POLICY INST., BALTIMORE BEHIND BARS: HOW TO REDUCE 
THE JAIL POPULATION, SAVE MONEY AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY (2010), 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-06_rep_baltbehindbars_md-ps-ac-
rd.pdf.; MD. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SEV. OFF. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS, TASK FORCE TO STUDY 
THE LAWS AND POLICIES RELATING TO REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS BY THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER (2013), 
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/018000/0189
24/unrestricted/20140000e.pdf; GOVERNOR’S COMM’N TO REFORM MARYLAND’S 
PRETRIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT (2014), 
http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrial-commission-final-
report.pdf [hereinafter Governor’s Comm’n.].  
15 Editorial, Unconstitutional Detention, BALT. SUN (Oct. 13, 2016), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-affordable-bail-
20161013-story.html. 
16 See 192d Report, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
17 Letter from Sandra Benson Brantley, Counsel to the Gen. Assembly, Off. of the 
Attn’y Gen., to the Hon. Erek L. Barron, et al. 1–2 (Oct. 11, 2016), 
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/bail%20letter%20advice%2010-
11-16.pdf. 
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Two weeks later, Maryland’s Attorney General urged the Rules 
Committee to recommend amendments to the Maryland Rules to 
 
expressly clarify that where the judicial officer determines, 
based on all applicable criteria, that bail is the least onerous 
condition necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance or to 
protect public safety, that officer must conduct an individualized 
inquiry into the defendant's financial circumstances and may not 
set bail that exceeds the defendant's means for the purpose of 
detaining the defendant.18  
 
The Rules Committee began considering proposed amendments 
a short time later.19 
 Among the materials submitted by the Rules Committee was a 
memorandum by former United States Attorney General Eric Holder 
and colleagues at the law firm of Covington & Burling to the Maryland 
Attorney General.20 The memorandum analyzed “the wealth-based 
nature of Maryland’s pretrial detention scheme,” and explained why it 
was illegal, “ripe for attack on both state law and federal constitutional 
grounds,” “irrational, unjust, and inefficient.”21 The memorandum 
concluded by recommending several changes that the judiciary “could 
initiate to improve the disturbing status quo in Maryland’s pretrial 
detention practices,” including:  
 
• a judicial resolution or rule change requiring that judicial 
officers refrain from imposing pretrial financial conditions that 
result in pretrial detention;  
                                                 
18 Letter from Brian E. Frosh, Md. Attn’y Gen., to the Hon. Alan M. Wilner, Chair, 
Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc. 1–2 (Oct. 25, 2016), 
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/News%20Documents/Rules_Committee_L
etter_on_Pretrial_Release.pdf. 
19 After the Criminal Rules Subcommittee met and forwarded proposed amendments, 
the full Rules Committee considered them at a meeting on Nov. 18, 2016. See 192d 
Report, supra note 3 at 3. 
20 Memorandum from Eric H. Holder Jr., Former U.S. Attn’y Gen., to Brian E, 
Frosh, Md. Attn’y Gen. (Oct. 3, 2016), 
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/Covington%20white%20paper%2
0Maryland%20Wealth-Based%20Pretrial%20Detention%20Scheme.pdf. 
21 Id. at 1. 
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• education of judicial officers on the efficacy and availability 
of alternatives to secured bail;  
• tracking data at commissioner and bail review hearings to 
better understand and address troubling disparities; and  
• operating automated court date reminder services that have 
been proven to increase defendants’ appearances in court.22 
 
 Around this time, the Office of the Public Defender issued a 
report entitled THE HIGH COST OF BAIL: HOW MARYLAND’S RELIANCE 
ON MONEY BAIL JAILS THE POOR AND COSTS THE COMMUNITY 
MILLIONS.23 That report analyzed more than 700,000 criminal (non-
traffic) cases filed in the District Court of Maryland in eighteen 
jurisdictions from 2011 to 2015.24 It found: 
 
1. Maryland’s reliance on money bail causes the routine, illegal 
incarceration of poor people: over a five-year period, no fewer 
than 46,597 defendants were detained on bail for more than five 
days at the start of their criminal case. Of these, more than 
17,434 defendants were detained on bail amounts of less than 
$5,000. 
2. For those who go to a bondsman, the price is steep. Maryland 
communities were charged more than $256 million in non-
refundable corporate bail bond premiums from 2011 to 2015. 
3. Defendants who use a bail bondsman are obligated to pay a 
corporate bail bond premium regardless of the outcome of the 
case. More than $75 million in bail bond premiums were 
charged in cases that were resolved without any finding of 
wrongdoing. 
4. Corporate bonds extract tens of millions of dollars from 
Maryland’s poorest zip codes, contributing to the perpetuation 
of poverty. 
5. The money bail system has a disproportionate impact on 
racial minorities: over five years, black defendants were charged 
                                                 
22 Id. at 1–2. 
23 Arpit Gupta, et al., THE HIGH COST OF BAIL: HOW MARYLAND’S RELIANCE ON 
MONEY BAIL JAILS THE POOR AND COSTS THE COMMUNITY MILLIONS (2016), 
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/High%20Cost%20of%20Bail.pdf. 
24 See id. at 4 (explaining that the report focused on criminal cases filed in the 
District Court of Maryland from 2011 to 2015). 
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premiums of at least $181 million, while defendants of all other 
races combined were charged $75 million. 
6. For all these costs, secured money bail that requires a payment 
for release is no more effective than unsecured bonds, for which 
defendants pay nothing unless they fail to appear for court.25 
  
 In its report, the Rules Committee summarized the problems as 
follows: 
 
There have been several independent, highly credible studies of 
the pre-trial release system in Maryland. Each of them has 
found, from documented evidence, that the reliance on money 
bail set at levels that the defendant cannot afford is (1) not 
uncommon, (2) irrational, unfair, unnecessary to ensure either 
the defendant’s appearance or public safety, (3) racially and 
ethnically discriminatory, and (4) fiscally unsound. These 
studies stress not only the fiscal cost to the State and the counties 
from incarcerating people who do not need to be incarcerated 
but also the human cost of incarceration – the loss of 
employment; the loss of housing, automobiles, and utilities and 
other services because of the loss of income; the loss of 
governmental benefits, such as Medicaid and Social Security 
SSI payments; the disruption of families – all of which can have 
a lasting and devastating impact on the defendant and his or her 
family.26 
 
Merely listing the policy concerns that led to the rule changes 
risks missing the forest for the trees. Fundamentally, the effort was 
about making our system better and fairer. The Chief Judge of the 
District Court put it well in his testimony to the Court of Appeals:  
 
The point of this rule is what . . . my father would remind me of, 
and that’s, “Can we do it better?” Can the current rule be 
modified so that we can have a more systematic way of 
performing bond reviews that go to some of the very valid 
concerns that the Attorney General raised in his advice letter? 
.  .  . 
                                                 
25 Id.  
26 192d Report, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
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[T]here’s an adage that I draw on. And I’ve heard President 
Kennedy refer to it, and President Obama refer to it, and it 
actually hails back to a Jewish leader from around the beginning 
of the common era named Hillel. And it’s, “If not me, then who? 
If not now, then when? And if not here, then where?” . . . And I 
respectfully suggest to this Court that when you’re deciding on 
this rule, if you apply that adage, that the answers should be, 
“This Court, this courtroom, and today.”27 
 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
  
 The amendments did not disturb the primary constitutional and 
legal principles applicable to pretrial release and detention decisions. 
Those are outlined below, as they provide the context for the rule 
changes discussed in Part III.  
 
A. Pretrial liberty is the norm; detention is the limited exception 
 
The idea that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial . . 
. is the carefully limited exception” is the bedrock principle that guides 
pretrial release decisions. 28 As the Court of Special Appeals has 
reiterated, “[a]n individual's ‘interest in liberty’ is of a ‘fundamental 
nature,’ . . . and at liberty’s core is the right to be free from arbitrary 
confinement by bodily restraint.”29 Consistent with these constitutional 
requirements, the amended rules adopt a preference for pretrial release 
by providing: 
 
(I) Construction. 
(A) This Rule is designed to promote the release of defendants 
on their own recognizance or, when necessary, unsecured bond. 
Additional conditions should be imposed on release only if the 
need to ensure appearance at court proceedings, to protect the 
community, victims, witnesses, or any other person and to 
                                                 
27 Open Meeting of the Court of Appeals to Consider the One Hundred Ninety-
Second Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Part 
3), COURT OF APPEALS, 12:34–12:53 & 14:46–15:25 (Jan. 5, 2017), 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals/media/2017openmtgs/20170105rulesmtgpt
3.mp4. 
28 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
29 Wheeler v. State, 864 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (internal 
citations omitted).  
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maintain the integrity of the judicial process is demonstrated by 
the circumstances of the individual case. Preference should be 
given to additional conditions without financial terms. 
(B) This Rule shall be construed to permit the release of a 
defendant pending trial except upon a finding by the judicial 
officer that, if the defendant is released, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the defendant (i) will not appear when required, 
or (ii) will be a danger to an alleged victim, another person, or 
the community. If such a finding is made, the defendant shall 
not be released.30 
 
B. Standards and burdens of proof 
 
 The standards and burdens of proof applicable to pretrial release 
determinations vary depending on the basis for restricting release 
(dangerousness vs. flight risk) and whether CP § 5-202 applies.31  
 
 1. Dangerousness 
 
Detention based on dangerousness is sometimes referred to as 
“preventative detention.”32 The Supreme Court has taken a restrictive 
approach, and has “upheld preventative detention based on 
dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals 
and subject to strong procedural protections.’”33  
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals in Wheeler v. State 
considered the due process requirements for pretrial detention and held 
that “‘preventive detention’ may be ordered pursuant to Md. Rule 4-
216, provided that the judicial officer is persuaded by clear and 
convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of 
pretrial release can reasonably protect against the danger that the 
defendant presents to an identifiable potential victim and/or to the 
community.”34  
                                                 
30 MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(1). 
31 See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 
BYU L. REV. 837, 873 (2016). 
32 Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive Detention and the Judicial 
Prediction of Dangerous for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 415, 415 (1996). 
33 Wheeler, 864 A.2d at 1062 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 
(2001). 
34 Id.  
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Put another way: 
 
‘preventive detention’ may not be ordered unless the judicial 
officer is persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that no 
condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release can 
reasonably protect against the danger that the defendant poses to 
the safety of an identifiable person or to the community at 
large.35  
 
This language indicates that the burden of proof is on the party 
seeking the detention, i.e., the State.  
 
2. Flight risk 
 
At present, no Maryland case, statute, or rule establishes the 
standard of proof applicable when the State seeks to detain someone 
based on risk of non-appearance.  
 The Federal Bail Reform Act requires clear and convincing 
evidence for detention based on dangerousness, but is silent as to the 
burden of proof for detention based on risk of nonappearance.36 In the 
absence of a clear standard of the “government’s burden of proof for a 
flight risk, several courts have agreed that it is a preponderance of the 
evidence.”37  
A case can be made, however, that the standard of proof for 
detention based on flight risk ought to be the same as the standard for 
detention based on dangerous, i.e., proof by clear and convincing 
evidence. As the Wheeler Court explained, “[i]n cases involving 
individual rights, whether criminal or civil, [t]he standard of proof [at a 
minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.’ 
‘[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial . . . is the carefully 
limited exception.’”38 
If standards of proof for detention are based on the impact of 
detention on the liberty interest of the individual, it makes little sense to 
use a lower standard of proof when the reason for detention is risk of 
                                                 
35 Id. at 1065. 
36 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B). 
37 Gouldin, supra note 31, at 873 n.159. 
38 Id.; Wheeler, 864 A.2d. at 1065. 
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nonappearance instead of dangerousness. Perhaps for this reason, the 
American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice provide that 
clear and convincing evidence should be the standard for both 
dangerousness and flight risk.39 The commentary explains, “The ‘clear 
and convincing evidence’ criterion is a stringent one, and is intended to 
emphasize that secure detention should be used only when facts show 
that it is necessary to prevent flight or assure the safety of the 
community.”40  
 
3. Rebuttable presumption created by Criminal Procedure 
Article (CP) § 5-202 
 
 Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Article (CP) § 5-202 prohibits 
court commissioners from releasing certain categories of defendants, 
but permits judges to do so.41 For five of these categories,42 the statute 
creates “a rebuttable presumption” that such a defendant “will flee and 
pose a danger to another person or the community.”43  
 Construing similar rebuttable presumptions in the Federal Bail 
Reform Act, federal courts have held that such presumptions shift the 
burden of production to the defendant, but the burden of persuasion – 
                                                 
39 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STANDARDS: PRETRIAL RELEASE §10-5.10(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 3d ed. 2007) (“In 
pretrial detention proceedings, the prosecutor should bear the burden of establishing 
by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of 
release will reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance in court and protect the 
safety of the community or any person.”). 
40 See id. §10-5.10. 
41 MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 5-202(b)–(f) (West 2017). 
42 These five categories are (1) defendants charged as drug kingpins, (2) defendants 
charged with a crime of violence who have previously been convicted of a crime of 
violence or certain firearm-related offenses, (3) defendants charged with committing 
certain crimes while released on bail or personal recognizance for a pending prior 
charge of committing one of those crimes, (4) defendants charged with certain 
firearm-related crimes who have previously been convicted of one of those crimes or 
a crime of violence, and (5) defendants who are registered sex offenders. See MD. 
CODE. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 5-202(b), (c), (d), (f) & (g). Note that the presumption 
for the third category – defendants charged with committing certain crimes while 
released on bail or personal recognizance for a pending prior charge of committing 
one of those crimes – ceases to apply after the “final determination of the prior 
charge.” Id. at § 5-202(d)(4). 
43 MD. CODE. CRIM. PRO. ANN. § 5-202(b)(3), (c)(3), (d)(4), (f)(3) & (g)(3). 
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the burden to justify pretrial detention – remains with the government.44 
If a defendant proffers or presents evidence to rebut the presumption, 
the court must determine whether detention is appropriate in light of 
statutory factors similar to those listed in Maryland Rule 4-216.1(f), 
giving due consideration to the statutory presumption as a factor 
militating against release.45  
 
C. The nature of the evidence or information at pretrial release 
hearings 
 
1. Rules of Evidence generally inapplicable 
 
 The evidentiary rules contained in Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, 
other than those relating to the competency of witnesses, do not apply 
to pretrial release proceedings under Rules 4–216, 4–216.1, 4–216.2 or 
4–216.3.46 However, the suspension of Title 5 does not mean that courts 
cannot hear evidence (as opposed to proffers) at bail review hearings. 
Like other proceedings where Title 5 is inapplicable—such as 
sentencing, suppression, and probation hearings—the suspension of 
Title 5 should best be understood as a means of expanding the universe 
of possible information for the court to consider without strict adherence 
to the rules of evidence that would govern a trial.  
 
2. Hearsay must be reasonably reliable 
 
 Because the Rules of Evidence do not apply at pretrial release 
hearings, the court generally may consider hearsay evidence.47 Thus, it 
is not uncommon for a court to consider a Statement of Probable Cause 
or an Application for Statement of Charges, which themselves are 
                                                 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the presumption shifts the 
burden of production to the defendant, but the burden of burden belongs to the 
government). 
45 Hir, 517 F.3d at 1086. 
46 MD. R. 5-101(b)(6). 
47 While there is no definitive decision on the matter, many courts have upheld the 
use of hearsay in preliminary hearings. See Christine Holst, The Confrontation 
Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process Solution, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1599, 
1611–12 (2010). 
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hearsay and also often contain hearsay statements allegedly made by 
witnesses.48  
A defendant’s right to due process and the standard of proof, 
however, prohibit a judge from detaining a person based on hearsay 
unless there are indicia that the hearsay is reasonably reliable.49 
Although Maryland’s appellate courts have not yet addressed this issue 
in the context of pretrial release hearings, they have done so in the 
context of other hearings where the rules of evidence do not apply, and 
have held that courts could consider hearsay only if it was reasonably 
reliable and probative.50  
 As the Federal Court for the District of Puerto Rico explained in 
the context of a pretrial release hearing: 
 
[T]he Court does not doubt that FBI agents were informed by a 
confidential witness that defendant stated that he would “fuck” 
certain persons upon his return from Cuba, nor, that defendant's 
son stated that if Barletta were taken out of the picture there 
would be no more case. What is at issue here, however, is not 
the credibility of the special agents who have testified, but that 
of the confidential witness(es), who were not present at the 
detention hearing, hence not subject to cross-examination. It is 
not ultimately necessary that the Government call its 
confidential witnesses to testify at a detention hearing. See 
United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 
1985) (holding that hearsay testimony is admissible at detention 
hearing). However, the (at times double) hearsay of the 
confidential witnesses provided to the Court is generic and 
perfunctory, quite conclusory, as well as unreliable to prove the 
particular circumstances surrounding the event referred to. For 
                                                 
48 E-mail from Mary-Denise Davis, Chief Attorney, Baltimore Central Booking Unit, 
Maryland Office of the Public Defender, to author (Sept. 13, 2017, 10:03 PM EST) 
(hereinafter “MDD email”) (on file with author).  
49 See State v. Fuller, 306 A.2d 1315, 1318 (Md. 1987) (explaining that admission of 
hearsay in a probation revocation hearing may be allowed, but only after analysis of 
the reliability). 
50 See id.; see also In re Billy W., 875 A.2d 734, 751 (Md. 2005) (permanency plan 
hearing); Baker v. State, 632 A.2d 783, 790 (Md. 1993) (sentencings); Brown v. 
State, 564 A.2d 772, 777 (Md. 1989) (probation revocation hearings); In re Damien 
F., 958 A.2d 402, 420 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (shelter care hearings); In re Delric 
H., 819 A.2d 1117, 1126 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (juvenile restitution hearings). 
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example, the confidential witness had reason to believe that the 
list of names from the computer was a “hit list”. No further 
reasons, however, are provided to support this conclusion. Also, 
Harold Rivera and defendant allegedly made statements in the 
confidential witness' presence pertaining to witnesses and 
government personnel. Other than such statements themselves, 
the Government has not provided other details about the same, 
which could provide an indicia of reliability of the hearsay.51  
 
3.Nature of evidence and information presented about charged 
crime 
 
 A judicial officer may properly consider the allegations in the 
case at hand when deciding whether or on what conditions to release the 
defendant.52 In Maryland, judges typically obtain this information from 
(a) the Statement of Probable Cause or Application for Statement of 
Charges filed by a police officer or complaining lay witness, and/or (b) 
a proffer made by the prosecutor.53 Although rarely done, prosecutors 
can also present live testimony or other exhibits at the hearing. In 
general, the parties may present “any information” relevant to the 
court’s determination of dangerousness or flight risk.54  
 
4. Insufficient proffers 
  
Prosecution proffers in support of detention may be insufficient. 
Maryland’s federal court has explained the extent to which pretrial 
detention based on prosecution proffers is appropriate, and recognized 
that proffers may not always be enough: 
 
[T]he case law supporting detention upon government proffers 
in no way requires a judicial officer to accept or accredit 
proffered evidence, nor does that case law assume that proffers 
in lieu of live testimony are appropriate in every case. The case 
                                                 
51 See Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d at 208 (holding that hearsay testimony at detention 
hearing must be sufficiently reliable). 
52 See MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(A) (providing that “the judicial officer shall consider,” 
inter alia, “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, [and] the nature of 
the evidence against the defendant”). 
53 See MDD email, supra note 48. 
54 See MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(F)–(G) (2017). 
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law certainly does not limit, and in fact supports, the discretion 
of the reviewing judicial officer to require the presentation of 
evidence. Of necessity, the propriety of a proffer as a basis for 
detention must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. When the 
government is able to proffer evidence that reflects ample and 
substantial corroboration for its contention that a defendant has 
committed an offense and is dangerous or a flight risk, 
efficiency and the need to conserve scarce judicial resources 
justify accepting that proffer in lieu of live testimony; and such 
proffers that are reflective of weighty and broad evidence of 
guilt, when considered with other information such as criminal 
history and lack of ties to the community, can be entirely proper 
bases for orders of detention. On the other hand, when the 
evidence proffered is the uncorroborated statement(s) of one or 
two police officers who allegedly observed a single act 
committed by the defendant, and when there is no other 
evidence proffered in support of the eyewitness testimony, the 
Court should consider the proffer with great care and accord it 
limited weight. Before entering any order of detention in such a 
case, the judicial officer should require the government to 
present live testimony able to withstand confrontation, long- and 
well-recognized as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for 
the discovery of truth.”55 
 
5. Courts are not required to accept the State’s allegations as 
true.  
 
 Some judges and prosecutors continue to believe that the court 
must accept the State’s allegations as true when making a pretrial 
release/detention determination.56 This is incorrect, for the following 
reasons: 
 
• It is inconsistent with the authority that places a burden of 
proof on the State when it seeks detention,57 and would convert 
this burden of proof into a mere pleading requirement;  
                                                 
55 United States v. Hammond, 44 F. Supp. 2d 743, 746 (D. Md. 1999) (internal 
citations omitted). 
56 See MDD email, supra note 48. 
57 See supra Part II.B. 
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• It is inconsistent with Rule 4-216.1’s requirement that the court 
consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, 
the nature of the evidence against the defendant,”58 and “any 
information presented by the defendant or defendant's 
attorney;”59 and  
• It is inconsistent with the procedural protections that the Court 
of Special Appeals has required in analogous hearings.60  
 
6. Procedural protections at analogous hearings 
 
 Unlike the Federal Bail Reform Act,61 Maryland’s rules 
governing pretrial release hearings do not describe in detail the 
procedural rights of the accused. To fill in the gaps, courts should look 
to the procedural protections required at analogous hearings.  
 One analogy is a shelter care hearing after a child is removed 
from the physical custody of a parent or guardian “to determine whether 
the temporary placement of the child outside of the home is 
warranted.”62 Just as pretrial release hearings must be conducted 
promptly after an arrest,63 a shelter care hearing ordinarily must be 
conducted promptly after a local department of social services removes 
the child from the parent’s or guardian’s custody and places him or her 
in shelter care.64 The governmental interests at stake are of comparable 
                                                 
58 MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(A). 
59 MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(G). 
60 See infra Part II.C.6. 
61 See infra Pt II.C.6; 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(2) (2008 Supp.). This paragraph 
provides in pertinent part: “At the [detention] hearing, such person has the 
right to be represented by counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain 
adequate representation, to have counsel appointed. The person shall be 
afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine 
witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or 
otherwise. The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do 
not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing. 
The facts the judicial officer uses to support a finding pursuant to subsection 
(e) that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
safety of any other person and the community shall be supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.” 
62 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §3-801(z) (2016 Supp.). 
63 See MD. R. 4-212(e)-(f); MD. R. 4-216.2(a). 
64 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. §3-815(C)(2) (ii) (West 2017) (“Unless 
extended on good cause shown, a shelter care hearing shall be held not later than 
next day on which the circuit court is in session.”). 
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importance.65 The severity of the potential deprivation is worse for the 
arrestee in the pretrial release hearing than for the parent or guardian in 
the shelter care hearing due to both its nature (incarceration versus 
removal of a child from the home) and duration.66 As with pretrial 
release hearings, the statute and rule governing shelter care hearings 
said little about how they were to be conducted. As with pretrial release 
hearings, the rules of evidence generally do not apply at shelter care 
hearings.67  
The case of In re Damien F.68 arose from two shelter care 
hearings where the local department proceeded solely on proffers and 
the circuit court denied the parent’s request to call witnesses.69 On 
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals considered “whether the court [at 
a shelter care hearing] was required to permit . . . the parents of the 
sheltered children[] to present witnesses at that hearing to prove their 
case and whether they had a right to cross-examine the Department's 
witnesses to contradict its case.”70 Based on (1) the right of the parent 
or guardian to be present at and participate in such hearings, (2) the 
parent or guardian’s right to counsel at such a hearing, and (3) the 
impossibility of resolving factual disputes raised by competing 
proffers71 – factors that are equally applicable at pretrial release 
                                                 
65 See MD. R. 216.1(b)(1)(B) (showing that in pretrial release hearings, that interest 
is reasonably ensuring public safety and the defendant’s appearance in court); see 
also MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. §3-815(d)(1) (West 2017) (finding in shelter 
care hearings, it is in protecting the safety and welfare of the child). 
66 See MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. §3-815(c)(4) (West 2017) (“A court may 
not order shelter care for more than 30 days except that shelter care may be extended 
for up to an additional 30 days if the court finds after a hearing held as part of an 
adjudication that continued shelter care is needed to provide for the safety of the 
child.” The duration of pretrial detention, by contrast, is not expressly limited. There 
are provisions requiring a speedy trial, but these often permit delays of much more 
than 30 or 60 days. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-103 (West 2017) 
(creating a window of up to 180 days); MD. R. 4-271(a)(1) (providing that “[t]he 
date for trial in the circuit court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of the 
appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit 
court pursuant to Rule 4-213, and shall be not later than 180 days after the earlier of 
those events,” but allowing exceptions and extensions for good cause). 
67 See MD. R. 4-216(h); MD. R. 5-101(b)(6)–(11) (2017); MD. R. 11-112(d). 
68 958 A.2d 402 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008). 
69 Id. at 411.  
70 Id. at 414. 
71 Id. at 412, 415–19. 
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hearings72 – the Court held that the juvenile court’s blanket refusal to 
allow the parent to cross-examine the department’s witnesses or present 
witnesses was an abuse of discretion.73 It then “set forth the following 
procedures to facilitate resolving the ‘conflicting proffers’ in an 
efficacious manner:”74  
 
When presented with a request by counsel for the parent or 
parents to be allowed to present witnesses at a shelter care 
hearing, as a threshold matter, the court should ask counsel to 
denote the allegations asserted to be in dispute. The judge should 
make an initial determination as to whether the competing 
versions of behavior or events, viz a viz, the proffered testimony 
versus the allegations in the petition, are in dispute. We hold 
that, unless the disputed allegation is probatively 
inconsequential to a determination of whether placement is 
required to protect a child from serious immediate danger or that 
removal from the home is necessary to provide for the safety and 
welfare of the child, the court must receive testimony as to the 
material, disputed allegations and a denial of the request to 
produce witnesses, in that instance, is an abuse of discretion.75 
 
 Another analogous proceeding is a probation or parole 
revocation hearing. In contrast to a presumptively innocent pretrial 
                                                 
72 For right to be present and participate, see MD. R. 4-212(e)&(f) (providing that 
“[t]he defendant shall be taken before a judicial officer” for the initial pretrial release 
determination); MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(G) (requiring judicial officer to consider “any 
information presented by the defendant or defendant’s attorney”); MD. R 4-216.2(a) 
(providing that “[a] defendant who is denied pretrial release by a commissioner or 
who for any reason remains in custody after a commissioner has determined 
conditions of release pursuant to Rule 4-216 shall be presented immediately to the 
District Court if the court is then in session, or if not, at the next session of the 
court”). For the right to counsel, see DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019, 1031 
(Md. 2013) (discussing initial hearings before court commissioners); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2) (West 2012) (describing pretrial release 
hearing before judge); MD. R. 4-216.2(b) (discussing bail reviews). As to the 
problem of reconciling competing proffers, the Court of Special Appeals noted that 
this problem exists regardless of whether the underlying cases is criminal or civil in 
nature. In re Damien F., 958 A.2d 417–19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008). 
73 In re Damien F., 958 A.2d at 422–23. 
74 Id. at 424. 
75 Id.  
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arrestee, a probationer or parolee has a diminished liberty interest, as  
“[r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which 
every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly 
dependent on observance of special parole [or probation] restrictions.”76 
The Supreme Court has held that a parolee or probationer accused of 
violating parole or probation is entitled under the Due Process Clause 77  
“to two hearings, one a preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and 
detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that 
he has committed a violation of his parole [or probation], and the other 
a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior to the making of the 
final revocation decision.”78 It explained the procedural protections 
required in these hearings: 
 
At the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled 
to notice of the alleged violations of probation or parole, an 
opportunity to appear and to present evidence in his own behalf, 
a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an 
independent decision maker, and a written report of the hearing. 
The final hearing is a less summary one because the decision 
under consideration is the ultimate decision to revoke rather than 
a mere determination of probable cause, but the “minimum 
requirements of due process” include very similar elements: 
“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of 
(probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the (probationer 
or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to 
be heard in person and to present witnesses and 
documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing 
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body 
such as a traditional parole board, members of which 
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written 
                                                 
76 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 
77 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ( “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
78 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973). 
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statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on 
and reasons for revoking (probation or) parole.”79  
 
 If a parent facing the temporary loss of custody of a child at a 
shelter care hearing has a conditional right to cross-examine the 
witnesses whose statements are being used against her and to present 
testimonial evidence,80 then so should a defendant at a pretrial release 
hearing where she faces the possibility of being incarcerated for far 
longer. If a parolee or probationer facing loss of his conditional liberty 
has a right “to present evidence in his own behalf” and “a conditional 
right to confront adverse witnesses,”81 then so should a presumptively 
innocent arrestee when facing a deprivation of “the absolute liberty to 
which every citizen is entitled.”82 
 
III. THE 2017 CHANGES 
 
The 2017 changes rewrote Rule 4-216.1 and amended several 
rules, most notably Rules 4-216 and 4-216.2.83 What follows is a 
summary of the main changes. 
 
A. Expanded list of non-financial conditions of release 
 
Consistent with its aim to reduce the use of money bail, the 
amendments expanded the list of non-financial conditions of release.  
First, they embraced the option of unsecured bonds.84 An 
unsecured bond is “a written obligation of the person signing the bond 
conditioned on the appearance of the defendant and providing for the 
payment of a penalty sum according to its terms”85 without the 
requirement of “collateral security” (i.e. “property deposited, pledged, 
or encumbered to secure the performance of a bond”).”86 Unlike a 
                                                 
79 Id. at 786 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)) (internal 
citation omitted). 
80 See supra text accompanying notes 62–77. 
81 Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)) 
(internal citation omitted). 
82 Id. at 781 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)). 
83 See Rules Order, supra note 2.   
84 See MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(1)(A), (b)(3), (c)(1). 
85 MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(2). 
86 MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(3). 
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secured bond, which typically requires a defendant and/or his family or 
friends to (a) deposit some or all of the penalty sum with the clerk of 
the court, (b) encumber real or personal property with a value equal to 
some or all of the penalty sum, or (c) pay a non-refundable fee to a 
“compensated surety” (typically a bail bond company), which then 
executes the bond, an unsecured bond merely requires the defendant 
(or, if specified by the judicial officer, the defendant and a friend or 
family member)87 to agree in writing to pay a penalty sum if the 
defendant fails to appear as required. An unsecured bond does not 
require the defendant or his friends or family to deposit money with the 
court, or pay a fee to a bondsman.88  
 
Second, the amendments added more non-financial conditions 
of release. These are: 
• one or more of the conditions authorized under Code, Criminal 
Law Article, §9-304 reasonably necessary to stop or prevent the 
intimidation of a victim or witness or a violation of Code, 
Criminal Law Article, §§ 9-302, 9-303, or 9-305, including a 
general no-contact order; 
• reasonable restrictions with respect to travel, association, and 
place of residence; 
• a requirement that the defendant maintain employment or, if 
unemployed, actively seek employment; 
• a requirement that the defendant maintain or commence an 
educational program; 
• a reasonable curfew, taking into account the defendant’s 
employment, educational, or other lawful commitments; 
• a requirement that the defendant refrain from possessing a 
firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon; 
 
• a requirement that the defendant refrain from excessive use of 
alcohol or use or possession of a narcotic drug or other 
controlled dangerous substance, as defined in Code, Criminal 
                                                 
87 See MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2)(L) (authorizing the judicial officer to require, as a 
condition of release, the “execution of unsecured bonds by the defendant and an 
uncompensated surety who (i) has a verifiable and lawful personal relationship with 
the defendant, (ii) is acceptable to the judicial officer, and (iii) is willing to execute 
such a bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer”). 
88 See Gupta, supra note 23, at 14; Governor’s Comm’n., supra note 14, at 23. 
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Law Article, §5-101 (f), without a prescription from a licensed 
medical practitioner; 
• a requirement that the defendant undergo available medical, 
psychological, or psychiatric treatment or counseling for drug or 
alcohol dependency; 
•  electronic monitoring; 
• periodic reporting to designated supervisory persons; 
• committing the defendant to the custody or supervision of a 
designated person or organization [including a pretrial services 
agency] that agrees to supervise the defendant and assist in 
ensuring the defendant’s appearance in court; 
• execution of unsecured bonds by the defendant and an 
uncompensated surety who (i) has a verifiable and lawful 
personal relationship with the defendant, (ii) is acceptable to the 
judicial officer, and (iii) is willing to execute such a bond in an 
amount specified by the judicial officer. 
• any other lawful condition that will help ensure the appearance 
of the defendant[]89 or the safety of each alleged victim, other 
persons, or the community.90 
 
B. Types of release, order of preference, and applicable legal 
standard.  
 
The new rule creates preferences for certain types of release, 
generally from least to most onerous. The most preferred type of release 
is personal recognizance. Next is an unsecured bond executed by the 
defendant alone. Third in line is release on personal recognizance or 
unsecured bond executed by the defendant, with special conditions 
other than “financial terms” (i.e. terms requiring collateral security or a 
guarantee of the defendant’s appearance by a compensated surety). 
                                                 
89 One relatively easy way to increase the likelihood that the defendant will appear in 
court is to secure a commitment from a trustworthy family member to remind the 
defendant of the court date as it approaches. Research on the use of texts or phone 
calls to remind defendants of court dates has begun to show that “simply reminding 
defendants of their upcoming court dates has a significant impact on reducing failure 
to appear rates.” PUBLIC JUST. INST., REPORT TO THE PRETRIAL RELEASE 
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE TASK FORCE TO STUDY THE LAWS AND POLICIES RELATING 
TO REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS BY THE OFFICE OF THE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 8 n.12 (2013) (mentioning several studies from around the 
country with comparable findings). 
90 MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2) (A)–(L) & (O). 
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Fourth is release on a financial term requiring collateral security. 
Finally, the least preferred is release on a financial term that requires a 
guarantee of the defendant’s appearance by a compensated surety.  
The following table lists the types of release, and provisions 
relating to preferences and required findings.  
 
Type of release Preferences Standard for 
applying (in lieu of 
less onerous 
alternative(s)) 
Personal 
recognizance 
Most preferred type of 
pretrial release. 
MD. R. 4-
216.1(b)(1)(A). 
 
Unsecured bond Second-most 
preferred type of 
pretrial release. 
MD. R. 4-
216.1(b)(1)(A). 
Judicial officer can 
use instead of 
personal 
recognizance “when 
necessary.”  
MD. R. 4-
216.1(b)(1)(A). 
Personal 
recognizance or 
unsecured bond 
with special 
conditions without 
financial terms91 
 
“If a judicial officer 
determines that a 
defendant should be 
released other than on 
personal recognizance 
or unsecured bond 
without special 
conditions, the 
judicial officer shall 
impose on the 
defendant the least 
onerous condition or 
combination of 
conditions of release 
set forth in section (d) 
of this Rule that will 
reasonably ensure (A) 
“Additional 
conditions should be 
imposed on release 
only if the need to 
ensure appearance at 
court proceedings, to 
protect the 
community, victims, 
witnesses, or any 
other person and to 
maintain the 
integrity of the 
judicial process is 
demonstrated by the 
circumstances of the 
individual case.”  
                                                 
91 These are listed supra Part III.A. 
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the appearance of the 
defendant, and (B) the 
safety of each alleged 
victim, other persons, 
and the community 
and may impose a 
financial condition 
only in accordance 
with section (e) of 
this Rule.”  
MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(3). 
 
Recognizing that 
some conditions 
involve financial cost 
or other burdens, the 
Rule provides that the 
judicial officer must 
take into account “the 
ability of the 
defendant to . . . 
comply with a special 
condition.”  
MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(2). 
 
In the same vein, the 
Rule also states that 
these conditions may 
be used to “the extent 
appropriate and 
capable of 
implementation.”  
MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2). 
MD. R. 4-
216.1(b)(1)(A). 
 
Release on 
conditions 
including a 
“special condition 
with financial 
terms,” i.e., “the 
requirement of 
Least preferred type 
of release.  
MD. R. 4-
216.1(b)(1)(A). 
 
Even among this 
disfavored type of 
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collateral security 
or the guarantee of 
the defendant’s 
appearance by a 
compensated surety 
as a condition of the 
defendant’s 
release.”92  
 
These include: 
• execution of a 
bond in an amount 
specified by the 
judicial officer 
secured by the 
deposit of collateral 
security equal in 
value to not more 
than 10% of the 
penalty amount of 
the bond or by the 
obligation of a 
surety, including a 
surety insurer, 
acceptable to the 
judicial officer; 
• execution of a 
bond secured by the 
deposit of collateral 
security of a value 
in excess of 10% of 
the penalty amount 
of the bond or by 
the obligation of a 
surety, including a 
surety insurer, 
acceptable to the 
judicial officer.93  
release, a requirement 
of a compensated 
surety is the most 
disfavored. 
MD. R. 4-
216.1(d)(2)(N). 
                                                 
92 MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(7). 
93 MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2)(M)–(N). 
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C. Factors a court must consider in determining whether to 
release a defendant pending trial and the conditions of any such 
release 
 
Rule 4-216.1 requires the court to consider a number of factors. 
It provides in pertinent part: 
 
(1) Recommendation of Pretrial Release Services Program 
In determining whether a defendant should be released and the 
conditions of release, the judicial officer shall give consideration 
to the recommendation of any pretrial release services program 
that has made a risk assessment of the defendant in accordance 
with a validated risk assessment tool and is willing to provide an 
acceptable level of supervision over the defendant during the 
period of release if so directed by the judicial officer. 
(2)  Other Factors 
In addition to any recommendation made in accordance with 
subsection (f)(1) of this Rule, the judicial officer shall consider 
the following factors: 
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the 
nature of the evidence against the defendant, and the potential 
sentence upon conviction; 
(B) the defendant's prior record of appearance at court 
proceedings or flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at 
court proceedings; 
(C) the defendant's family ties, employment status and history, 
financial resources, reputation, character and mental condition, 
length of residence in the community, and length of residence in 
this State; 
(D) any request made under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, 
§5-201 (a) for reasonable protections for the safety of an alleged 
victim;94 
                                                 
94 The Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure §5-201(a) provide that  
(1) The court or a District Court commissioner shall consider including, as a 
condition of pretrial release for a defendant, reasonable protections for the safety of 
the alleged victim. 
(2) If a victim has requested reasonable protections for safety, the court or a District 
Court commissioner shall consider including, as a condition of pretrial release, 
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(E) any recommendation of an agency that conducts pretrial 
release investigations; 
(F) any information presented by the State’s Attorney and any 
recommendation of the State's Attorney; 
(G) any information presented by the defendant or defendant's 
attorney; 
(H) the danger of the defendant to an alleged victim, another 
person, or the community; 
(I) the danger of the defendant to himself or herself; and  
(J) any other factor bearing on the risk of a willful failure to 
appear and the safety of each alleged victim, another person, or 
the community, including all prior convictions95 and any prior 
                                                 
provisions regarding no contact with the alleged victim or the alleged victim’s 
premises or place of employment. MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 5-201(a) (West 
2017). 
95 That this factor expressly mentions “prior convictions” but not prior arrests or 
charges suggests that the court should not consider mere arrests or charges that did 
not result in a conviction. See Immanuel v. Comptroller of Maryland, 141 A.3d 181, 
193 n.6 (Md. 2016) (explaining that “Maryland has long accepted the doctrine of 
expressio (or inclusio) unius est exclusio alterius, or the expression of one thing is 
the exclusion of another” (citation omitted)). 
 This interpretation of the rule is bolstered by two other considerations. First, 
most arrests and charges that did not result in convictions can be expunged. See MD. 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105 (2008 Repl. Vol. & 2017 Supp.). Interpreting to 
Rule 4-216.1(f)(2) to permit consideration of such unproven charges would lead to 
the absurd result that whether a person is detained or released would depend on 
whether he expunged prior charges that did not result in convictions. See generally 
Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 (Md. 2001) (explaining that 
“[t]he words of the rule must also be construed so as not to yield a result which is 
unreasonable, absurd, or illogical”). 
 Second, the mere fact that a defendant has been arrested and charged is not 
admissible in sentencing hearings, which are analogous to pretrial release hearings in 
that the rules of evidence (other than those regarding the competency of witnesses) 
apply in neither proceeding. See MD. R. 5-101(b)(6) & (9). A sentencing judge errs if 
he or she “consider[s] a bare list of prior arrests that did not result in convictions.” 
Craddock v. State, 494 A.2d 971, 975-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (citing Henry v. 
State, 328 A.2d 293, 303 (Md. 1974)). In Henry, the Court of Appeals quoted the 
following explanation with approval: “While a sentencing judge's inquiry is not 
limited by the strict rules of evidence, and evidence of less probative value than is 
required for a determination of guilt may be considered, the judge may not consider 
evidence which possesses such a low degree of reliability that it raises a substantial 
possibility that his judgment may be influenced by inaccurate or false information. 
Consideration of such information leads to unwarranted assumption of guilt. For this 
reason it has been recognized that when they stand alone, bald accusations of 
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adjudications of delinquency that occurred within three years of 
the date the defendant is charged as an adult.96 
 
D. Additional limits and requirements applicable to special 
conditions with financial terms (i.e., secured bonds or collateral 
security) 
 
  1. Affordability 
 
“A judicial officer may not impose a special condition of release 
with financial terms in form or amount that results in the pretrial 
detention of the defendant solely because the defendant is financially 
incapable of meeting that condition.”97 In determining what the 
defendant can afford, “the judicial officer may consider all resources 
available to the defendant from any lawful source.”98 A committee note 
following these provisions suggests sources for this information: 
 
Information regarding the defendant’s financial situation may 
come from several sources. The Initial Appearance 
Questionnaire Form used by District Court commissioners seeks 
information from the defendant regarding employment, 
occupation, amount and source of income, housing status, 
marital status, and number of dependents relying on the 
defendant’s income. The criminal and juvenile record checks 
made by the commissioner also may reveal relevant 
information. Additional information may be available to the 
judge at a bail review proceeding from a defense attorney, the 
State’s Attorney, and a pretrial services unit.99 
 
In the analogous situation where a court assesses a defendant’s 
ability to afford private counsel, the Court of Appeals has cautioned 
                                                 
criminal conduct for which a person either has not been tried or has been tried and 
acquitted may not be considered by the sentencing judge.” Henry, 328 A.2d at 303 
(internal citations omitted). Similarly, mere arrests and charges, without more, are 
not sufficiently reliable to be considered by a judge at a pretrial release hearing.  
96 MD. R. 4-216.1(f). 
97 MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(A). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. committee note. 
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courts to avoid imputing assets to the defendant that are not necessarily 
available to him: 
 
Absent clear evidence of some firm commitment by the family 
to devote their resources to appellant's defense, those resources 
cannot be imputed to appellant or considered in determining his 
indigence because he has no right to or control over them. They 
are not his assets.100 
 
If a judge imposes a financial condition that the defendant is 
unable to satisfy, Rule 4-216.3 provides a means for the court, on 
motion or on its own initiative, to modify or eliminate the financial 
condition. Subsection (b) provides: 
 
After a charging document has been filed, the court, on motion 
of any party or on its own initiative and after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, may revoke an order of pretrial release 
or amend it to impose additional or different conditions of 
release, subject to the standards and requirements set forth in 
Rule 4-216.1.  If its decision results in the detention of the 
defendant, the court shall state the reasons for its action in 
writing or on the record.  A judge may alter conditions set by a 
commissioner or another judge.101 
 
Prompt review by the court of unaffordable financial conditions 
is consistent with Rule 4-216.3’s mandate that the courts monitor the 
situations of people held pretrial “to eliminate unnecessary detention”:  
 
In order to eliminate unnecessary detention, the court shall 
exercise supervision over the detention of defendants pending 
trial. It shall require from the sheriff, warden, or other custodial 
officer a weekly report listing each defendant within its 
jurisdiction who has been held in custody in excess of seven 
days pending preliminary hearing, trial, sentencing, or appeal. 
The report shall give the reason for the detention of each 
defendant.102 
 
                                                 
100 Baldwin v. State, 444 A.2d 1058, 1068 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982). 
101 MD. R. 4-216.3(b). 
102 MD. R. 4-216.3(c).  
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2. Financial terms cannot be used to address dangerousness 
 
“Special conditions of release with financial terms are 
appropriate only to ensure the appearance of the defendant and may not 
be imposed solely to prevent future criminal conduct during the pretrial 
period or to protect the safety of any person or the community . . . .”103  
It is important to note that this prohibition extends to conditions 
requiring “collateral security or the guarantee of the defendant’s 
appearance by a compensated surety as a condition of the defendant’s 
release,” but not to unsecured bonds executed by the defendant alone or 
by the defendant and by the defendant and an uncompensated surety 
who has a verifiable and lawful personal relationship with the defendant 
(usually a family member or friend), as such unsecured bonds do not 
fall within the definition of a “special condition of release with financial 
terms.”104  
 
3. Other restrictions  
 
Special conditions of release with financial terms may not be 
imposed “to punish the defendant or to placate public opinion.”105 They 
“may not be set by reference to a predetermined schedule of amounts 
fixed according to the nature of the charge.”106  
 
4. Required advice 
 
“If the judicial officer requires collateral security, the judicial 
officer shall advise the defendant that, if the defendant or an 
uncompensated surety posts the required cash or other property, 
it will be refunded at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings 
if the defendant has not defaulted in the performance of the 
conditions of the bond.”107  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
103 MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(B). 
104 MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(7); see also MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2)(L). 
105 MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(B). 
106 MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(C).  
107 MD. R. 4-216.1(g). 
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The 2017 amendments to the court rules governing pretrial 
release and detention, if properly implemented, should eliminate the use 
of unaffordable bail. In theory, this change should reduce unnecessary 
pretrial detention. In practice, it will do so only if our courts faithfully 
adhere to the procedural protections that exist to ensure that “liberty is 
the norm, and detention prior to trial . . . is the carefully limited 
exception.”108 
 
                                                 
108 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
